THE DEVASTATING CRISIS, SINGAPORE’S EXTRA-ASEAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR ASEAN by Tongzon, Jose L.
THE DEVASTATING CRISIS, SINGAPORE￿S EXTRA-ASEAN
FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
FOR ASEAN
(Not to be quoted without the author￿s permission)
Jose L. Tongzon
National University of Singapore
Working Paper No. 153
September 2002
Postal address: P.O. Box 6501, S-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden. Office address: Sveav￿gen 65
Telephone: +46 8 736 93 60  Telefax: +46 8 31 30 17  E-mail: japan@hhs.se  Internet:
http://www.hhs.se/eijs1
The Devastating Crisis, Singapore￿s Extra-ASEAN Free Trade
Agreements and their Implications for ASEAN 
*
(Not to be quoted without the author￿s permission)
Jose L. Tongzon
Department of Economics
National University of Singapore
1 Arts Link, Singapore
Email: ecsjt@nus.edu.sg
Abstract
This paper aims to assess the implications of the Asian economic crisis of 1997/98 and
Singapore￿s current initiatives to forge extra-ASEAN free trade agreements for the future
of ASEAN economic integration. Have the recent crisis and the resulting economic
difficulties undermined ASEAN￿s resolve to deepen their level of economic integration?
Would Singapore￿s current initiatives at forging free trade deals with countries outside the
region undermine the region￿s economic integration? The perception by some members in
ASEAN that these bilateral free trade deals can be used as a ￿backdoor￿ entry into the
ASEAN markets is particularly a matter of serious concern, which could threaten the very
existence of ASEAN as a regional economic grouping.
It is argued that the recent crisis has instead galvanised ASEAN countries￿
determination to move forward in economic integration and on the basis of the most recent
trends, there is strong indication that the political resolve is likely to be translated into
concrete measures. However, there remain other more challenging tasks before the vision
of a regional free trade can be realised. Further, the fear that Singapore￿s FTAs with other
countries will undermine AFTA has not been based on concrete grounds. However,
Singapore needs to assure other ASEAN members that Singapore is not abandoning
ASEAN but remains committed to the success of AFTA with greater awareness of the
political sensitivities of the other members.
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The Devastating Crisis, Singapore￿s Extra-ASEAN Free Trade
Agreements and their Implications for ASEAN
Perhaps there were two major developments since the inception of ASEAN Free Trade
Area (AFTA) which have seriously tested the resolve of the ASEAN countries to bring
this vision into reality: the recent economic crisis of 1997/1998 and Singapore￿s current
foray into bilateral free trade agreements with non-ASEAN countries.
The crisis of 1997 and 1998 has significantly stalled the economic progress experienced
by ASEAN countries and set back the economic and social gains they have achieved in the
past decades. The tragic terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 have further exacerbated
their economic problems and dampened the outlook for greater trade liberalization within
the framework of ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). The recent initiatives by the
Singapore government to forge bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) with other countries
outside ASEAN have also put further into question the future and effectiveness of ASEAN
as a viable regional organization. The lack of a coordinated approach to the recent crisis
and ineffectiveness to respond immediately to the crisis have already put into question the
effectiveness of ASEAN as a rallying point. Against this backdrop, this paper will try to
analyse whether the recent crisis has undermined ASEAN countries￿ resolve to push ahead
with the AFTA vision and whether (or to what extent) Singapore￿s recent initiatives to
form bilateral free trade agreements with other countries outside the region would
undermine ASEAN￿s future economic integration.
1. The recent crisis and the future of AFTA
The recent crisis has had negative implications for the future of ASEAN co-operation. Trade
liberalization entails short-term adjustment costs resulting from a reallocation of human
resources consistent with the principle of comparative advantage. During the transition period
workers that cannot re-equip themselves with the appropriate skills can find themselves
structurally unemployed. In countries such as Indonesia and Thailand where unemployment
and poverty have already risen from their pre-crisis levels due to the crisis, the costs of
adjustments would become more severe and difficult.
1 Corollary to this is the issue of
division of gains and costs. The crisis has reinforced the fear that trade liberalization would
only benefit the more developed and competitive member countries at the expense of
surrendering one￿s national priorities and autonomy in policy setting. For example, despite its
recent official agreement to accelerate AFTA￿s implementation, there were indications that
Vietnam￿s pace of implementation of its trade liberalization commitments has further slowed
during and after the crisis. Vietnam￿s economic development strategy for 1999 emphasized
agricultural development with domestic market orientation and importance of the state-
owned enterprises (The Economist, 14-20 November 1998). This indication was confirmed
by Vietnamese officials￿ admission that the regional crisis has slowed down their economic
reforms and forced them to be more inward-looking (Dow Jones International News, 2
January 1999). Vietnam has not made any reference to their efforts to join the WTO or their
commitment to tariff reductions until recently with the signing of the historic US-Vietnam
bilateral trade accord and the impending membership of China in the WTO.
                                                
1 There are also other concerns including Malaysia￿s refusal to include the motor vehicles industry in the
liberalization under AFTA.3
The crisis, by causing greater debt servicing commitments and exchange rate
instability, has also accentuated the major concern that countries with higher levels of
protection, such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam, will have to give up
more in terms of tariff revenue loss, current account deterioration and job losses than
countries with lower levels of protection such as Singapore, Brunei and Malaysia. It has
highlighted the question of mutuality of external trade and investment gains from AFTA. It
has also intensified intra-ASEAN competition for non-ASEAN export markets and foreign
investments, and could further raise this longstanding question of division of external gains
among the ASEAN countries.
Despite these negative implications, the crisis seems to have strengthened their
political will and resolve for closer economic integration. The crisis has invoked the ASEAN
sense of ￿shared destiny￿ and thus, reinforced their sense of determination to forge a greater
level of economic co-operation; further, the contagion effect of the financial crisis has further
demonstrated their high degree of economic inter-dependence, and therefore, highlighted the
need for some policy co-ordination. It can be argued that the crisis has not at all derailed the
implementation of their AFTA commitments. The progress made in meeting their AFTA
commitment has been well on track. As Table 1 shows, in the area of Common Effective
Preferential Tariff  (CEPT) commitments, during the crisis the ASEAN6 countries (with the
exception of Thailand) have agreed to commit themselves to reduce their average tariff rates
to below 5 percent by 2001, ahead of the target year 2002. 
2
Moreover, they are now more committed to realize the vision of free trade amongst
themselves by signing an agreement at the September 1999 ASEAN Economic Ministers
Meeting in Singapore to adopt a target of zero tariffs to be achieved by 2015 for the six old
members of ASEAN, and by 2018 for the four new ones (the transitional members of
ASEAN).
Table 1. ASEAN6 Average CEPT Tariff Rates (%, 1997)
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ASEAN6 6.68 6.08 4.97 4.41 3.52 3.35 2.93 2.48
*  All figures are mutually agreed tariff commitments, except for 1996 and 1997,
which are actual CEPT tariff rates.
Source: ASEAN Secretariat (1997).
Apart from the deepening of tariff cuts, they have also resolved to expand further the
commodity coverage of AFTA. After deciding to include the politically sensitive
unprocessed agricultural products (UAPs) into the CEPT scheme, to be phased into the
Inclusion List in five equal instalments, significant progress has been made since 1996. Out
of a total of 1,995 UAP tariff lines, 1,358 tariff lines were phased into the Inclusion List in
                                                
2 Under the Common Effective Preferential Tariffs (CEPT) scheme of AFTA, the ASEAN founding
countries have agreed to reduce tariffs on all commodities traded within the member countries to between 0
and 5 per cent ad valorem, by the year 2002, except for a few commodities for national security reasons,
protection of public morals, human, animal and plant life and health, and the protection of articles of artistic,
historic or archaeological value. To avail of these preferences, the principle of reciprocity applies.4
1996 and another 402 tariff lines were given TEL status to be phased into the CEPT scheme
in seven equal instalments between 1997 and 2003.
Due to ASEAN efforts to review and shorten the General Exclusion List (GEL),
some 230 tariff lines (29 percent) have been transferred out of the GEL into the Inclusion List
at the 13
th AFTA Council meeting in September 1999. Consequently, the Inclusion List now
covers over 98 percent of all tariff lines for the ASEAN6 countries, as shown in Table 2.
Table 2. CEPT Product List, as of 1 January 2002: ASEAN6























































Notes: The figures in brackets are percentage shares for the various categories.
Source: ASEAN Secretariat (2002)
Although the Inclusion Lists for the transitional member economies are not as large, they are
still significant. Vietnam￿s Inclusion List has also expanded in absolute and proportional
terms since her first submission of CEPT product list in 1996. See Table 3.
Table 3. CEPT Product List, as of 1 January 2002: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV)
Country Inclusion List
1996           2002
Temporary
Exclusion List
1996        2002
General Exclusion
List
1996        2002
Sensitive List
1996        2002
       Total






















































Notes: Vietnam joined ASEAN in 1995, while Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia joined only quite recently; Figures in
brackets are percentages.
Source: ASEAN Secretariat (1997 & 2002)5
Some progress has also been made with regards to the inclusion of sensitive products.
Some UAPs are classified as ￿sensitive￿ or ￿highly sensitive￿ which called for a special
arrangement. At the 31
st ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting in October 1999 they have
endorsed a Protocol on the Special Arrangement for Sensitive and Highly Sensitive Products
which set out the mechanism for the integration of sensitive products into the CEPT scheme
by 2010 with 0-5 percent tariff rates subject to no quantitative restrictions (QRs) or non-tariff
barriers (NTBs). Rice was, however, exempted from this mechanism by allowing it to have
an end-tariff of over 5 percent, but with no QRs or NTBs. Rice has always been a very
difficult commodity to be liberalized due to the fact that each ASEAN member country,
particularly Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, would like to develop self-sufficiency in
this commodity as a matter of economic and political security.
In most cases, unilateral tariff reductions have been undertaken with the assumption
that even without reciprocity trade liberalization would be in their long-term economic
interests. Moreover, the private industry sector, having realized the economic benefits of
trade liberalisation in a sub-regional framework, has been pressuring their respect
governments to expedite the process of trade liberalisation under AFTA.
The beginning of this year marked the target year for the final implementation of
the ASEAN6 countries￿ tariff reduction commitment to between 0 and 5 percent. By 1
January 2002, based on their respective Inclusion Lists as shown in Table 2, the following
number of items did not have their duties reduced to 0-5%: 16 items (0.25%) of Brunei￿s
2002 IL; 66 items (0.92%) of Indonesia￿s 2002 IL; 922 items (9.2%) of Malaysia￿s 2002
IL; 199 items (3.57%) of the Philippines￿ 2002 IL; and 472 items (5.18%) of Thailand￿s
2002 IL (ASEAN Secretariat, 2002). Please refer to Table 4 for more details.
Most of these temporarily excluded products are in the motor vehicles and parts
(which were exempted from the 2002 deadline and given an extra-grace period of four years
before its inclusion mainly due to the strong objection from Malaysia) and in the plastic and
chemicals categories as suggested by Indonesia. As pointed out by the ASEAN Secretariat,
the ASEAN6 member countries have always made clear that their objective for 2002 was
to reduce the duties for the products in the Inclusion List to 0-5% with some flexibility
allowed. If this is the case, then one can say that the ASEAN6 countries have successfully
realised the first phase of regional economic integration.
There are, however, other remaining tasks in the second phase of the regional
economic integration, which are more difficult to carry out. First, the non-tariff barriers that
significantly exist in the region still need to be eliminated or harmonised. Second, there is a
need to improve the institutional structure of ASEAN to make it more effective in rallying the
individual members towards a co-ordinated stance or common action in dealing with future
crises and in the implementation and enforcement of decisions. The long-standing principle
of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other members and the principle of consensus
have done well for the survival and development of ASEAN in the past, but has also been
partly responsible for the slow progress in economic integration. The second phase is
certainly more challenging than the first phase of trade liberalization. Surcharges, technical
standards and customs procedures are the three most commonly used instruments of
protection adopted by the ASEAN countries. Further, although there has been more
differentiation in the commodities produced in these economies and thus creating more scope
for greater complementarity within them, there are still significant differences between them,
which could slow down the progress in economic integration. The crisis and the expansion of
ASEAN to include the transitional economies of the region have certainly widened the level
of diversity within ASEAN in terms of economic development, economic priorities and
readiness towards economic liberalisation.    6
Table 4. Implementation of Tariff Reduction Commitments, as of 1 January 2002
Countries Number of Tariff Items Percentages
  0-5% >5% Total 0-5% >5% Total
Brunei 6,260 16 6,276 99.75 0.25 100
Indonesia 7,147 66 7,213 99.08 0.92 100
Malaysia 9,117 922 10,039 90.82 9.18 100
Philippines 5,372 199 5,571 96.43 3.57 100
Singapore 5,859 5,859 100 0 100
Thailand 8,632 472 9,104 94.82 5.18 100
ASEAN6 42,337 1,685 44,022 96.17 3.83 100
         
Cambodia 238 2,877 3115 7.64 92.36 100
Lao PDR 1,297 801 2,098 61.82 38.18 100
Myanmar 2,848 732 3,580 79.55 20.45 100
Vietnam 3,566 1,939 5,505 64.78 35.22 100
ASEAN4 7,949 6,349 14,298 55.6 44.4 100
         
ASEAN10 50,286 8,034 58,360 86.17 13.83 100
Source: ASEAN Secretariat (2002).
2. Singapore Extra-ASEAN Free Trade Agreements and their implications for ASEAN
Singapore is an active member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
and a signatory of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) whose ultimate objective is to
create a regional market among the countries of Southeast Asia where goods and services
can move freely across borders unhampered by any trade barriers. This vision will be
realized in stages, and the year 2002 was the target year for the reduction of tariffs across
the economies of the six older members (i.e. Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand and Brunei) to between 0 and 5 percent with the complete elimination
of all trade barriers by 2015.
As a small open economy with high dependence on foreign trade, Singapore has
been an active proponent for this regional economic initiative and considered it as one of
the pillars of its foreign trade policy. However, right after the recent Asian economic crisis
there has been a concerted effort by Singapore to establish free trade agreements (FTAs)
with other countries - a deviation from its previous behaviour. After the formation of New
Zealand-Singapore FTA, it has recently signed a free trade agreement with Japan and
made substantial progress in its negotiations with the United States and Australia.
This section will attempt to provide an overview of the reasons behind Singapore￿s
recent enthusiasm to forge FTAs with other countries outside the region and evaluate their
economic implications for ASEAN and the validity of the concerns raised by other7
ASEAN countries over Singapore￿s FTA initiatives.  The economic evaluation will be
based on a case study of the recently signed Japan-Singapore FTA.
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2.1. Why bilateral free trade agreements for Singapore?
Singapore￿s high dependence on trade has been widely documented. In fact, the country
has one of the highest trade-to-GDP ratios in the world. Therefore, it is in the nation￿s
interests to ensure that trade flows around the world will be as uninterrupted as possible.
Hence, Singapore, described as ￿a vocal champion of global free trade￿, has been one of
the avid supporters of the multilateral trade negotiations under the auspices of the World
Trade Organization (WTO). However, Singapore is also an active member of regional
groupings such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC). The recent initiatives at forging free trade agreements with countries
outside the region could be interpreted as part of the overall trend towards regionalism.
One factor behind this trend relates to the growing doubt about the ability of the
WTO to advance trade liberalisation under the multilateral system particularly after the
failure of the WTO meeting in Seattle. Apart from the difficulty of reconciling the diverse
and often conflicting interests of its 139 members, trade negotiations have also been
complicated by the emergence of controversial issues like human rights, and
environmental degradation. Moreover, there appears to be a lack of leadership in
multilateral trade negotiations.  With the U.S. becoming no longer a hegemonic power in
international trade and given the absence of a dominant force directing negotiations,
reaching a consensus in the organisation seems to be an insurmountable task. Singapore,
like other proponents of FTAs, believes that reducing the number of negotiators can lead
to a corresponding decrease in the number and complexity of issues involved, giving free
trade negotiations a better chance of success. Building on this likely liberalisation of trade
within FTAs, multilateral free trade can then be subsequently achieved. This is so, as
domestic confidence regarding market liberalisation will be built up through FTAs,
therefore preparing them for the multilateral stage (Ministry of Trade & Industry (MTI),
Singapore). FTAs are, therefore, deemed to be building blocks to eventual global free
trade. This positive view of FTAs have been endorsed by the WTO, which stated in its
Singapore Ministerial Conference, that such agreements are complementary to the
multilateral trading system.
Second, given the trend towards regionalism among developed countries, the
formation of FTAs is considered as a way to maintain her bargaining position vis-￿-vis
other regional groupings and not to be left out of the major export markets. Indeed,
Singapore￿s Trade and Industry Minister George Yeo had expressed concerns that these
FTAs could deal Singapore out of the table. It is in these circumstances that Singapore
decided to ￿play the system￿ (Low, 2000), and thus embarked on a quest for FTAs with its
￿strategic trading partners￿. In doing so, Singapore will be able to maintain a foothold in
the major regional groupings that have been formed and hence remain engaged in the
global trading scene.
Apart from this trend towards regionalism, there could be other specific factors that
have prompted Singapore￿s move to expedite the negotiations for bilateral free trade
agreements with non-ASEAN countries:
                                                
3 The choice of Japan-Singapore FTA rather than the one-year old New Zealand-Singapore FTA is because
Japan is ASEAN￿s major trading partner and source of foreign investment.8
First, Singapore might have observed that AFTA has not been progressing as fast
as she had expected. The growing emphasis on inward-looking policies after the1997/98
Asian economic crisis in some ASEAN countries and Malaysia￿s deferment of its
commitment to fully liberalize its automotive industry were seen as signs of backsliding
on AFTA commitments. The anticipated slow progress in economic integration and the
need for Singapore to position itself in the changing global trading environment have
caused Singapore to form free trade agreements with other countries outside the region. As
the Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong put it, ￿Those who can run faster should run faster.
They shouldn￿t be restrained by those who don￿t want to run at all.￿ (Reyes, Asiaweek,
2000).
Second, Singapore could be planning to reduce her dependence on the regional
economies after the bitter experience with the recent regional economic crisis by forging
closer economic integration with her major trading partners outside the region and thus
ensuring economic resilience and security. Seen in this context, Singapore￿s bilateral pact
with Japan would provide a launching pad for her to penetrate the wider East Asian
economies, considering that Japan is also planning to form bilateral trading arrangements
with Korea and China. Similarly, her approach to EFTA countries is done with the
prospect of the larger but highly protective European market, while the Chilean and US
initiatives are to link Singapore with the wider Latin and North American markets. 
4
2.2 Implications for ASEAN
Singapore￿s pursuit of extra-ASEAN FTAs has been criticized by some fellow ASEAN
members. Apart from the criticism that other ASEAN countries were not adequately
consulted by Singapore as to the objectives and modalities of the  proposed pacts and how
they would fit in within the AFTA process, these arrangements are seen by some as
undermining ASEAN as a preferential trading arrangement. Specifically, it is claimed that
these free trade arrangements could be providing Singapore￿s FTA partners with a
backdoor entry into the ASEAN Free Trade Area. Are there any grounds for these
criticisms?
2.2.1 Benefits for ASEAN?
Before addressing the major concerns raised by other ASEAN countries, there is a need to
explore whether there are direct and indirect benefits that can be derived by other ASEAN
countries from these extra- ASEAN FTAs. To be more explicit, the following analysis will
focus on the new Japan-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (JSFTA), which is probably the
most promising and important agreement for Singapore.
5 Although the proposed US-
Singapore agreement is also important, it has not yet been concluded as the one with
Japan.
                                                
4 For more detailed discussions of Singapore￿s motivations to forge free trade agreements beyond the region,
see Rajan et al. (2001).
5 On 12 October 2001 Japanese and Singaporean officials have finally agreed on the provisions for the
proposed free trade agreement between their two countries after a series of negotiations. Formally known as
the Japan-Singapore Economic Agreement for a New Age Partnership, this FTA was officially signed by
their respective governments by early 2002 with an expected date of operation in the middle of 2002. This is
Singapore￿s second FTA outside the region while first for Japan. The free trade agreement will also cover
non-trade sectors including investments, services and customs procedures with cooperation in tourism and
other fields (The Straits Times, 13 October 2001:4).9
The Joint Study Group has explicitly laid down various measures for Singapore
and Japan to cooperate that could have a direct impact on other ASEAN countries. For
instance, if the proposal to build the Japan Business Centre in Singapore is realised,
ASEAN countries will benefit from the joint ventures that Japanese and Singapore SMEs
form. This is so, as one of the stated aims of this centre is to enable these joint ventures to
collaborate in exploring business opportunities in ASEAN countries.
It was also suggested that the regulatory and policy framework that Singapore and
Japan will cooperate in setting up to bring together their infocommunications and e-
commerce industries could be extended to include the e-ASEAN
6 initiative. The
realisation of such a plan will see the entire ASEAN region market linked to Japan on the
electronic realm. Such a situation is likely to boost the attractiveness of ASEAN countries
as an investment location, since firms based in the relatively low-cost ASEAN countries
will have electronic access to the vast Japanese market. However, doubts have been raised
about the possibility of transforming the e-ASEAN plan into reality. This is mainly due to
the diverse stages of development that the various ASEAN countries are in. Will there be
political will to see through this long-drawn project, which entails the harmonising of the
more sophisticated Singapore One and Multimedia Super Corridor (Malaysia) projects,
with the barely-existent telecommunications network in Myanmar and Cambodia? Until
such a project is completed, the proposed electronic link-up to Japan under the JSFTA is
likely to remain a pipedream without concrete benefits for ASEAN.
Other specific measures include the provision of assistance for ASEAN members
to develop their human resources. However, there have already been initiatives to do so
even before the JSFTA was mooted. In 1997, an agreement was already sealed by the two
countries to combine their resources to help developing countries through the "Japan-
Singapore Partnership Programme for the 21st Century" (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 7
th
May 1997). As such, any further attempts to assist the ASEAN countries in the area of
human resource development could be provided under the auspices of this programme,
thus rendering the efforts under the JSFTA to be largely duplicative and providing little
additional benefits to the ASEAN countries.
Another recommendation by the Joint Study Group is that the Japan National
Tourist Organisation (JNTO) and Singapore Tourism Board (STB) will cooperate in
developing tourism in the region. Such an initiative can be beneficial for many of the
ASEAN members, who count tourism as one of their important sources of revenue.
However, there are also existing efforts to do so through the ASEAN Promotion Centre on
Trade, Investment and Tourism.
By now, we should recognise the fact that Japan has maintained a strong
relationship with ASEAN since the formalisation of the relationship in 1977. Despite fears
that Japan may be losing interest in ASEAN as it turns its attention to its Northeast Asian
neighbours, we see that Japan still maintains a variety of economic, social and political
links to the ASEAN countries through platforms like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),
Japan-ASEAN Program for Comprehensive Human Resources Development, ASEAN-
Japan Forum, Japan-ASEAN exchange project, etc. The ASEAN Promotion Centre on
Trade, Investment and Tourism, which was established by Japan in 1981, also continues to
realize its main aims of promoting exports from ASEAN to Japan, accelerating the inflow
of investment from Japan to ASEAN, and to encourage Japanese tourists to visit ASEAN
countries.
                                                
6 The e-ASEAN initiative is a bold move by the regional grouping to link their markets electronically, hence
creating a ￿seamless￿ market of 500 million people.10
In view of the above, we could argue that if Singapore was keen on cooperating
with Japan to provide various forms of assistance to its ASEAN counterparts, it has
numerous opportunities to do so under the existing schemes. Hence, it is unlikely that the
JSFTA will have much to offer to ASEAN in terms of providing a new link through which
Japan can explicitly channel various forms of assistance.
Perhaps in recognition of the fact that the JSFTA may offer little extra benefits in
terms of providing ASEAN with new avenues for assistance from Japan, Singapore￿s
leaders have preferred to emphasise the ￿catalytic￿ role that the JSFTA can provide for
ASEAN. Although the JSFTA may not offer well-defined marginal economic benefits for
ASEAN countries, there can be some spillover effects from the trade pact between
Singapore and Japan. As the WTO secretary-general, Supachai Panitchpakdi, noted,
￿Whatever Singapore does, it can generate spinoffs for ASEAN￿ (The Business Times, 21
February 2001) Indeed, PM Goh had argued that Singapore￿s trade pacts with non-
ASEAN countries could ￿help investors outside the region to look at the potentials of
ASEAN as a whole￿ (Agence France Presse, 26 January 2001). This is important, as
foreign investors￿ confidence in this region have been badly shaken by the Asian financial
crisis and the series of political unrest in several ASEAN countries after the crisis. Japan￿s
decision to forge a comprehensive agreement with an ASEAN country can thus be viewed
as an endorsement of the long run prospects of the region, and hence pave the way for the
international community to regain confidence and interest in this region.
Next, we should recognise that Singapore does not have unlimited capacity to
absorb all of the investment that can result from the JSFTA. It is likely that the efforts to
attract Japanese investors to Singapore through the various investment missions, and
business seminars, can result in significant ￿spill-overs￿ to the ASEAN countries. As
mentioned earlier, Japanese investors in Singapore have tended to engage in ￿third country
investment￿ projects, using Singapore as a springboard for further investment in
neighbouring countries. Hence, successful attempts to attract Japanese investors to
Singapore through the schemes mooted under the JSFTA, can provide a valuable stepping
stone towards further Japanese investment in the region as a whole. It has to be qualified
that the abovementioned ￿spillover￿ effects can only be realised if conditions in ASEAN
countries are conducive for the investors. Thus, the onus is still on the ASEAN member
countries to prove their viability and reliability as an investment location.
There have also been suggestions that Singapore￿s moves to conclude free-trade
agreements can set the pace for other ASEAN countries to do the same in future. At
present, many ASEAN countries are still dogged by the domestic problems that stemmed
largely from the financial crisis in 1997/98. The preoccupation to resolve these internal
issues has caused them to devote too little attention and resources to react to the
international trend of regionalization. Singapore is therefore positioning itself as a
convenient example that these ASEAN countries can follow when they are ready to forge
FTAs after overcoming their domestic problems.
7 However, fundamental differences
between Singapore and its neighbours suggest that its experience in the JSFTA may be of
limited use to its neighbours.
First of all, as Schott (1991) points out, an essential ingredient of a successful FTA
is that the members have similar laws and regulations governing trade flows. Indeed, the
JSFTA negotiations have been largely smooth going so far, as both countries see eye to
eye on many issues, like the liberalising of trade flows in many goods and services. On the
                                                
7 Quite recently it has been reported that the Philippines and Thailand respectively are also pursuing similar
free trade initiatives with Japan.11
contrary, many sectors in ASEAN countries, like the automotive and financial industries
have yet to be fully liberalised. Hence, as long as such protectionist inclinations persist in
the ASEAN countries, it would be difficult for them to accept Singapore￿s guidelines for
use in any of their future FTAs with Japan.
Next, Singapore is unlikely to face much domestic opposition to the FTA since it is
at a relatively similar stage of development as Japan. This is so, as whatever trade that is
created between Singapore and Japan as a result of the JSFTA, is likely to be intra- rather
than inter-industry. As such, the FTA will cause minimal adjustments in trade flows, and
thus insignificant redistribution of income and employment (Schott, 1991). In contrast to
this, an FTA between Japan and the other less developed ASEAN countries may cause
more domestic disruptions as the domestic capital-intensive industries may find
themselves edged out by the more efficient Japanese producers.  Thus, it might less useful
for ASEAN countries to seek reference from Singapore￿s experience in dealing with such
FTA-related issues.
2.2.2 Concerns of ASEAN members
Although these initiatives could bring some indirect benefits for ASEAN, these bilateral
trade pacts have been riddled with criticisms coming primarily from the former President
of Indonesia Abdurrahman Wahid and Prime Minister of Malaysia Mahathir Mohamad.
Both have shown no hesitation in attacking the actions of Singapore. Former President
Wahid was calling Singaporeans as looking only after themselves in search for more
profits. Prime Minister Mahathir has expressed concern that these non-ASEAN bilateral
trading arrangements could undermine ASEAN solidarity. Singapore￿s formation of
bilateral free trade agreements with New Zealand and Japan, and the pending ones with
the US and Australia has been perceived as forsaking ASEAN interest for national
interest. But the key contention is that Singapore could be providing its potential FTA
partners with a backdoor into the AFTA. Critics have alleged that these FTA partners will
be able to gain tariff-free access into ASEAN markets through Singapore, without
providing reciprocal access to the ASEAN countries (Asiaweek, 8
th December 2000).
A closer analysis of the situation however, reveals that there is little truth in this
argument. The fundamental reason that refutes the ￿back door￿ claim lies in the rules of
origin. As defined by the WTO, these are essentially rules that ￿define where a product
was made￿. Since members of an FTA often maintain their own tariffs on non-members,
there is a tendency for countries outside the area to circumvent the higher tariffs in a
member country by exporting to the lowest-tariff member country, and then re-exporting
to the higher tariff ones, at the preferential tariff rate established under the FTA. Rules of
origin will rein in such behaviour since products must fulfill the specified criteria before
being able to enjoy the preferential tariff treatment granted by the FTA.
8 In the case of
AFTA, member countries￿ exports to one another will only be eligible for the Common
Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme (CEPT),
9 if these goods have a local content of 40%,
i.e. 40% of the value-added to the product must originate from one or more ASEAN
countries.  Such requirements can inflate the costs of any foreign producer who attempts to
                                                
8 In practice, however, there are problems of implementation of the rules of origin in many countries due to
inadequate and poor quality of institutions including poor bureaucracy, lack of transparency and so on.
9 This is a scheme through which ASEAN members seek to progressively lower the effective tariff levels
among themselves, with the aim of reducing or eliminating the tariffs on various categories of goods like,
manufactured products, pharmaceuticals, vegetable oils, etc. (AFTA Reader)12
seek any back door entry into AFTA. This is so, as they will need to relocate the entire
manufacturing plant, or at least split up the production process between the home and low-
tariff AFTA country, in order to fulfill the 40% local content requirements. The costs
involved in doing so are likely to offset any savings in tariff payments that result from the
use of the ￿back door￿.
Approximately 96% of exports to Singapore are already exempted from any tariffs.
This implies that the tariff differential between these exports to Singapore and those to
other ASEAN countries is already at a maximum (at a tariff rate of 0% there is no further
room for tariff reductions in Singapore for these imports). In view of these tariff
differentials, Singapore already presents the opportunity for firms to gain a back door into
AFTA, Thus, even without a bilateral pact with Singapore, foreign exporters who are keen
on seeking a back door to any other ASEAN country would have already based at least
40% of their production process in Singapore to take advantage of the tariff differentials. It
is probably safe to assume that the foreign exporters who have not done so, have had
found the opportunity cost to be too great compared to any tariff payments that can be
saved as a result.
It is unlikely that a bilateral trade pact with Singapore will provide much cause for
these foreign exporters to review their decisions. The reason is as follows: Under
Singapore￿s current FTAs, the only preferential tariff treatment granted to its partners is
the elimination of customs duty on the dutiable goods. This means that only goods in 4
product categories
10 will enjoy tariff concessions. Thus, if Singapore maintains such a
criterion for its future FTAs, there will hardly be any further increase in the tariff
differentials between any exports from its FTA partners to Singapore and those to the
other AFTA members, that will make it worthwhile for exporters from the partner
countries to try to use Singapore as a ￿backdoor￿ into the AFTA economies.
The automotive industry ￿ An Example
The automotive industry is a prominent example of a protected industry in ASEAN
countries. Under the AFTA CEPT scheme, ASEAN countries have agreed to reduce the
tariffs on automotive imports from AFTA members, to a 0 to 5% range by 2002. However,
these countries still maintain high tariffs on identical imports from non-AFTA countries.
Thus, there could be fears that Japanese automotive firms may make use of this scheme to
penetrate the ASEAN markets through Singapore, after the JSFTA comes into effect.
Specifically, in order to fulfill AFTA￿s rules of origin, Japan may export 60%-completed
motor vehicles into Singapore for completion, or even start a complete manufacturing
plant from scratch in Singapore. The final product will then be exported into ASEAN
countries at the stipulated preferential rate. Several factors however, will ensure that such
a scenario will probably never materialise.
Firstly, major Japanese automotive firms like Mitsubishi Motors, Nissan and
Toyota have already established automotive manufacturing plants in ASEAN countries
like Thailand and the Philippines. These were facilitated by the ASEAN Industrial
Complementation (AIC) and Brand-to-Brand (BBC) schemes, which provided reduced
tariffs on automotive parts traded within the region (Yoshino, 2000). These schemes have,
therefore, provided non-AFTA members with a somewhat de facto backdoor into AFTA. .
By basing their production operations in ASEAN countries, Japanese firms are able to
offset part of the high tariff costs of exporting into these countries, by procuring for
cheaper intermediate products and manufacturing their vehicles within the region. Given
                                                
10 These are stout and porter, beer and ale, and medicated and other forms of samsoo (alcohol).13
that Japanese automotive firms view the North American and EU countries as their main
target markets, it is questionable if they will find it worthwhile to build an additional
manufacturing or assembly plant in Singapore with the express purpose of penetrating an
ASEAN market whose demands for Japanese vehicles can be adequately provided for by
their (the Japanese￿s firms) existing plants in ASEAN.
The extreme case that these Japanese automobile firms will decide to establish
manufacturing or assembly plants in Singapore in order to take advantage of the JSFTA
and AFTA is even more remote. This is so, as there are no motor vehicle manufacturing or
assembly plants in Singapore, and given the government￿s push to develop high value-
added light manufacturing industries like electronics, it is unlikely to encourage the
development of a car assembly or manufacturing plant in Singapore. Moreover, the high
labour costs and land prices in Singapore can inflate the costs of production to reduce or
even eliminate whatever cost savings from lower tariff payments under the CEPT.
More importantly, the CEPT scheme is carried out on a quid pro quo basis, where
a member can only enjoy the preferential tariff if it reciprocates such tariff reduction.
Singapore has placed motor vehicles on its General Exceptions List in the AFTA
11. As
such, it is allowed to maintain its existing tariffs on motor vehicles imports from ASEAN
countries. Thus, any automotive exports from Singapore to the other AFTA economies
will not benefit from the CEPT scheme at all. This effectively eliminates any backdoor to
AFTA for Japanese firms, as they will face the same tariff rates whether they export from
Japan or Singapore.
 Given all the above factors, the JSFTA is unlikely to offer any profitable back
door for Japanese automotive firms that wish to circumvent the high tariffs in the other
ASEAN countries through Singapore. 
12
Is Singapore leaving its neighbours behind?
As we see from the preceding discussion, the major economic reason for ASEAN￿s
lukewarm attitude to the JSFTA (and Singapore￿s other FTAs in general) is more likely to
be unsubstantiated. The core of their displeasure may lie in a less tangible domain. This is
described succinctly by an editorial in Malaysia￿s national newspaper, Berita Harian. It
commented that ￿Singapore may not have done any wrong in legal terms but morally, the
republic￿s action showed that it had undermined friendship in ASEAN￿ (Agence France
Presse, 25 November 2000). In seeking to enhance the bilateral relationship with countries
outside the region, Singapore￿s actions have been perceived as that of forsaking its less
prosperous neighbours and, in the former Indonesian President￿s words, ￿just look[ing]
after themselves￿ (The Business Times, 27
th November 2000).
In a sense, as Prime Minister Goh acknowledged, such accusations are ￿right up to
a point￿. Singapore has long expressed its worries of the Southeast Asian region being
relegated to the position of an ￿Asian backwater￿, since ASEAN countries have yet to
recover its pre-financial crisis vibrancy, while Northeast Asia continues to enjoy brighter
growth prospects. Coupled with the trend towards the creation of FTAs in the other parts
of the world, the country￿s initiatives to establish stronger bilateral relations with extra-
regional countries are borne of necessity than choice. Given that the stability of its
                                                
11 High taxes on motor vehicles are a vital tool in Singapore￿s supply management policy of its vehicle
population, and it is unlikely that the country will make any exceptions for it under any free trade agreement
that it enters.
12 However, this possibility of trade deflection cannot be fully ruled out for other goods and services since
under AFTA the rest of the ASEAN members will have to lower their duties to exports from Singapore ￿
these lower duties could be significant enough to more than offset the costs of trade deflection.14
relations with its neighbours will have a significant impact on its future, it is imperative
for Singapore to seek a balance between its attitude of hard-nosed pragmatism, and the
sensitivities of its neighbours. It has attempted to do so, by highlighting the positive
impacts that its FTAs can have on its neighbours. However, as mentioned above, the
JSFTA will probably offer little marginal benefits to ASEAN countries, while the spill-
over effects are neither guaranteed nor highly quantifiable. As such, Singapore may have
to continue to raise the profile of the various strategies that demonstrate its commitments
to the region. Such strategies include direct investments in these countries
13, and the
provision of soft-loans to the countries in need, through the Asian Development Bank￿s
soft-loan window. Nonetheless, given Singapore￿s image as the ￿brainy kid classmates
love to hate, but who some secretly admire￿ (Asiaweek, 8 December 2000), such political
rhetoric by the neighbours is probably unavoidable, and the country will just have to take
it in its stride.
3. Conclusion
Based on the analysis of recent developments, it seems that the crisis has not on the whole
undermined the ASEAN countries￿ resolve to realize their vision to establish a regional
free trade area despite the short-term negative implications of trade liberalization. Already
significant progress has been made in the implementation of their trade liberalization
commitments under AFTA, despite the growing economic and political difficulties faced by
some member countries engendered by the recent economic crisis and other inherent
structural and institutional weaknesses. Unilateral liberalization process in ASEAN has also
begun, particularly in previously high tariff economies of Indonesia, the Philippines and
Thailand. This has resulted in the harmonization of tariff structures to a considerable degree.
Deregulation and privatisation have also complemented this trend. However, the second
phase of economic integration poses a more challenging and difficult task due mainly to the
significant differences that exist within these countries in terms of economic development,
national priorities and levels of efficiency.
On the other hand, Singapore￿s recent initiatives to forge extra-ASEAN free trade
agreements would not in any way undermine ASEAN￿s economic integration and its
future. The fear that Singapore could be used as a backdoor entry into the ASEAN market
has not been substantiated based on available evidence. Nor should these extra-ASEAN
free trade initiatives by Singapore be interpreted as deserting ASEAN. Regionalism is
considered to present opportunities for enlarging existing markets and other economic
spill-over effects of trade liberalization, but more importantly, is considered important in
maintaining regional peace and security, which is essential for long-term economic
progress and security. Regionalism is especially important for Singapore, which is highly
reliant on the region for its water and food supply. It is, therefore, against her strategic
interest to ignore the importance of regionalism in favour of forging economic alliances
with other countries.
As for the specific impact of the JSFTA on ASEAN, it may also turn out that little
significant marginal economic gains are directly in store for these countries.
Nevertheless, there could be some spin-offs for the ASEAN countries if the cooperation
efforts between Singapore and Japan under their trade pact are successful. While we
cannot confirm if ASEAN countries can gain significantly from the JSFTA, it is fairly safe
                                                
13 According to the Ministry of Trade & Industry, Singapore has been among the top investors in Indonesia,
Thailand, Myanmar and Vietnam.15
to believe that the concerns of the resulting negative adverse effects are unlikely to occur,
although we cannot entirely rule out its possibility.
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